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Abstract: Over the last decade states passed hundreds of immigration bills covering a range 
of policy areas. This article considers the recent state legislative surge against scholarly 
treatments of immigration federalism, and identifies the symbolic politics in state lawmaking. 
The analysis combines a historical treatment of key court decisions that delineated 
boundaries of state and federal immigration roles with a legislative analysis of over 2200 
immigration bills passed between 2006 and 2013, to identify the numerous ways in which 
national immigration policy shapes state measures. It argues that recent laws must be 
considered against symbolic federalism which privileges state sovereignty and justifies 
social policy devolution by advancing frames of intergovernmental conflict, state-level 
policy pragmatism, and federal ineffectiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
On 8 November 1994, voters in California overwhelmingly approved a ballot measure, Proposition 
187, which denied a variety of public services—including public schooling and medical care—to those 
whom public servants “suspected” of being unauthorized immigrants. Polling conducted just in advance 
of the state’s general election showed a public well-aware that even if passed, Proposition 187 would 
end up in court. The measure’s enforceability did not seem to matter to the thirty-seven percent of 
respondents who claimed that their goal in voting for the measure was to “send a message that something 
has to be done about illegal immigration” [1,2]. 
By 1997, a federal district court ruled California’s measure unconstitutional on the grounds of 
preemption, meaning that the state initiative created an immigration enforcement scheme that interfered 
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with the federal government’s sole authority over immigration regulation and enforcement1 . This 
outcome, however, did not dampen the desire of states to pass similar laws. In 2004, Arizona voters 
passed Proposition 200 which was modeled on California’s failed initiative. Colorado’s own efforts in 
2006 ran afoul of the state’s electoral laws, but in 2006, the Georgia legislature passed the Georgia 
Security and Immigration Compliance Act (SB 529), a piece of omnibus legislation2 that covered law 
enforcement, identification requirements, employment and human trafficking in addition to other areas 
associated with immigration and immigrants. Such copycatting persists. After Arizona passed SB 1070 
in 2010, Alabama, Indiana Georgia, Utah and South Carolina introduced and passed similar enforcement 
bills shortly afterwards. State laws designed to prevent from immigrants from voting are also similar to 
one another. By 2013 an additional 16 state omnibus immigration bills similar to Georgia’s SB 529 were 
on the books. More recently, the states of Maryland, Texas, New York and others extended in-state 
tuition for public colleges and universities to undocumented immigrant students, and did so despite a 
federal statute designed to limit such access. Collectively, these laws have raised the stakes for the 
national government, forcing inter-systemic conflicts and amplifying a sense that the national 
government is absent from an immigration crisis. 
When federal immigration reform efforts in Congress failed in 2006 and again in 2007, statehouses 
across the country seemed prepared to step in: by the end of 2007, each of the fifty state legislatures 
contributed to the passage of hundreds of bills addressing immigration and immigrants [3]. In successive 
years, the total would climb: by end of 2014, states had passed over 3000 immigration-related bills [4]. 
Regardless of whether states strike accommodating or restrictive postures, however, it would seem that 
states, having long ago ceded power to the national government on these matters, are ready to take it 
back. Neither a century old doctrine of national supremacy over immigration policy and its enforcement, 
nor the promise of costly court battles have deterred them. 
Federalism simultaneously allows for the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries and state independence 
from Washington DC. The debate in the growing literature on immigration federalism (the subnational 
development of regulatory and settlement policies) [5], divides over whether states are operating  
within their historical and constitutionally mandated role as demi-sovereigns in areas of immigrant 
settlement [6–8], or whether state activism poses a threat to nationally-enforced civil rights and 
individual rights derived primarily from the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause [9–11]. As 
a mode of policy delivery, however, federalism has changed in complex ways since the emergence of 
national supremacy on immigration matters. For example, the national government became the primary 
protector of civil rights after longtime resistance from the states [12]. In other policy areas, the national 
government’s authority has coincided with vertical integration of policy delivery. The national security 
regime demands cooperation from state and local enforcement agencies areas where intergovernmental 
responsibilities were once distinctive [13]; immigration enforcement agencies, a key component now of 
                                                 
1  LULAC v. Wilson 1997. 
2  Omnibus bills package separate (and sometimes unrelated) measures into one bill which is then brought up in a legislature 
for a simple “yes” or “no” vote. In this case, state omnibus bills would combine immigration-related topics such as 
immigration law enforcement, employment eligibility enforcement, anti-human trafficking and appropriations to various 
agencies including those providing immigrant services. 
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national security, regularly make use of state and local agencies to expand their reach and to carry out 
national initiatives [14,15]. 
Furthermore, the frequency and extent of recent state lawmaking, as well as utilization of statehouses 
and court battles to register discontent with the national government, show a political movement at work. 
Legal and social science scholarship attending to this revival of subnational lawmaking considers a broad 
range of political and structural factors responsible for the surge. Both approaches attend to the 
instrumental aspects of federalism—as governance structure and with layered modes of policy delivery. 
What is less often discussed, however, are the expressive aspects of state-level lawmaking—specifically 
the manner in which federalism operates as a frame of reference that privileges the role of states in policy 
making, and locates the root of intractable social issues in the national government. 
This ideological or symbolic federalism advances states as the original guardians of local interests—
these are, after all, the entities the founders maintained because the smaller domains allowed for tailored 
policy approaches sensitive to local needs and more responsive to the people ([16], pp. 4–5). Over time, 
federalism has offered the political rationale for state sovereignty; progressive and conservative interests 
have appealed to state authority in staking and justifying their positions on a range of policy issues ([16], 
p. 9). Such appeals to state sovereignty have justified state resistance to civil rights for racial, ethnic, 
gender, and sexual minorities; state authority also determines rights of access to the welfare state, and is 
central in debates over budgetary and fiscal responsibilities. 
Given that claims about privileges and entitlements, individual and group rights, and fiscal 
responsibility all collide in immigration politics, it is about time to attend to the expressive aspects of 
state involvement in immigration matters. 
The argument unfolds as follows: first it advances the importance of federalism and immigration 
federalism specifically, as operating within ideological frames that highlight conflicts between states and 
the national government. The second part looks at the ascendance of the national regulatory scheme at the 
expense of states and identifies the transformation in state laws from regulation of immigrant entry to 
regulation then restriction of immigrant access to public services, to participation in immigration law 
enforcement. The third part explores the recent wave of state-level laws: it offers an analysis of state 
bills passed between 2006 and 2013 to reveal areas of substantive and symbolic conflict with federal 
laws. Part four offers an assessment of the symbolic politics of immigration federalism that focuses on 
intergovernmental conflict as well as the curative potential for immigration federalism in absence of 
national leadership or consensus on the issue. 
2. The Instrumental and Expressive Faces of Immigration Federalism 
To begin, it is necessary to consider the possible roles that states can play in immigration politics as 
conduits for national policy imperatives and as legislative bodies that amass local interests and responses 
to conditions at the ground level. Social science scholarship has identified conditions within states that 
explain variation in policy approaches. In the case of state forays into direct and indirect enforcement 
and regulation, some view these laws as products of racial divisions and anxieties, where conservative 
political ideologies correspond with restrictive measures [17–19]. In the case of Arizona—presently the 
state taking the most punitive stance against immigrants—scholars have deftly covered the genesis of 
that state’s particular brand of immigration confrontation at the granular level. Arizona’s recent history 
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with the vigilante Minuteman Project, Maricopa county Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s ongoing civil rights 
catastrophes, and efforts to impose Anglo-conformity on public education curricula, all reflect 
conservative policy responses to sizable demographic shifts, societal transformation and racial and 
economic insecurity [18,20]. 
States, however, also serve as alternative venues for nationally-active interests faced with stalemate 
in Congress. The press, for example, has been following the state by state actions of Kris Kobach 
(currently the Attorney General of Kansas) who drafted Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s SB 56, and 
has been tapped to do the same for other states as well. He and his financial backers have publicly 
announced a statehouse-by-statehouse strategy to achieve immigration control via state measures that 
create an inhospitable climate for unauthorized immigrants and encourage “self-deportation” [21–24]. 
Likewise, in their work on advocacy coalitions, political scientists Gary Reich and Jay Barth tracked the 
same interest groups operating in five Republican statehouses pushing for restrictive laws [25]. This is 
not mere diffusion as some have argued [26], but a coordinated strategy put forward by national interest 
groups and policy entrepreneurs to venue-shop downwards. 
States serve as interlocutors for ground-level pressures and national immigration interests. However, 
rather than be merely sandwiched in the “middle-tier”, states also serve as agents in the debate 
particularly when they assert their sovereignty. Peter Spiro has argued that states provide a policy 
“steam-valve” [27] that reduces pressure on a national government to seek consensus on a divisive and 
intractable policy issue. The neutrality implied in that analogy, however, discounts the manner in which 
some states have devised clear stances as “open” or “hostile” to their resident unauthorized populations. 
In this respect, states increasingly function as pressure cookers for the debate over whether the nation 
should embrace its undocumented immigrants. In the most extreme cases, like California in 1994 and 
Arizona in 2010, policy making occurs with expectation of court battles with the federal government 
where the generation of such conflict is understood both in the public as well as the leadership to “send 
a message” about that state’s position on the issue [2,28,29]. 
Over the last decade, state legislative activity has not dispersed pressure in immigration politics, it has 
raised it: there are now fifty potential stages for state-federal showdowns on the issue. The fault lines of 
federal-state conflicts take shape depending on which aspect of immigration a statehouse opts to resolve. 
Whether states pursue more inclusive or more restrictive policies, a common grievance is the lack of 
congressional action to cope with immigration and its associated issues. The frustration voiced at the state 
level and covered in news sources depicts states burdened with fiscal and governance responsibilities in the 
absence of congressional leadership and comprehensive federal-level reforms [29–37]. 
A distinctive conflict frame arises over enforcement: states opting to strengthen enforcement roles cite 
limited or absent of federal enforcement as the source of their unauthorized immigrant populations. 
However, what makes this conflict distinctive is that while federal enforcement is portrayed as deficient, 
states engage cooperatively with federal agencies in apprehending irregular immigrants, and in policing 
and sanctioning employers of unauthorized workers [14,38]. State attempts to assert authority over 
immigration also address a debate over whether immigrants add to the economic good or cost more than 
they contribute. Viewed from the perspective of balanced budget conservativism [39], such laws represent 
resistance to a national program seen to enable undeserving populations. What appears at first a novel 
effort among states to govern the field of immigration, is actually the next step in the conservative response 
to the national government’s role in the rights revolution of the 1950s–1960s. 
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This is not the first attempt to see state-level immigration policy as reflecting the symbolic politics of 
anti-Washington, anti-welfare state conservativism. In a 1996 article, Kitty Calavita offered an analysis of 
California’s Proposition 187 (1994) as a condensation symbol for economic uncertainty, socio-economic 
transformation, and xenophobic nationalism. Calavita’s analysis placed the punitive ballot measure in 
the context of past restrictionist policies that coincided with economic recession, worker anxieties, and 
linked these to vast structural transformations wrought by globalization. That context, combined with 
balanced budget conservatism, ensured the popularity of a law designed to punish unauthorized 
immigrants [40]. More significantly to Calavita’s argument, these expressive (or symbolic) elements of 
187 proved more important than the instrumental, or curative claims of the law. California voters, as 
polls leading up to the general election showed, understood that the law might never be implemented 
and would result in costly court battles; these likely outcomes were secondary to voters sensing an 
opportunity to “send a message” to Washington. 
The analysis that follows owes its conceptualization to Calavita’s study of Proposition 187, and also 
starts with Murray Edelman’s assumption that lawmaking—as all political activity—has instrumental and 
expressive facets that are equally deserving of inquiry ([41], p. 12). However, rather than focus on laws as 
reflective of public opinion at the state level, this examination of instrumental and expressive facets of 
state laws by placing this activity within a legal doctrine and policy regime that rests on national 
supremacy. It regards the recent and unprecedented surge in state lawmaking as instrumental in that most 
of these are policy efforts designed to solve immigration-related problems, and have emerged in response 
to political impasse at the national level. Additionally, it attends to the expressive aspects of immigration 
lawmaking at the national level by examining intergovernmental conflict generated by these state efforts. 
While often, and for good reason, studies of state-federal conflict will focus on restrictive measures like 
Proposition 187 or SB 1070, this analysis seeks to broaden the scope of inquiry into immigration federalism 
by also considering laws that accommodate unauthorized immigrants. 
3. Immigration and Federalism in the Courts 
As central as immigration has been to the development and identity of the United States as a nation, 
immigration has long challenged the national government to regulate flows, ensure security, economic 
demands, and manage claims-making. Immigration has also long exposed rifts within the federal system, 
where the Court’s consistent endorsement of national supremacy in matters relating to the entry and exit 
of foreigners often conflicts with the regional and local desire for greater flexibility from national policy. 
This section identifies the jurisdictional conflicts that evolved into a legal doctrine of national supremacy 
at cost to state power. The goal is to identify the historical shift in the balance of regulatory powers to 
the national government that occurred in the Supreme Court, and to outline the constraints within which 
states continue to operate. The analysis provides a backdrop that helps explain why current jurisdictional 
clashes instigated by states are significant focusing events more so for their symbolic stance against the 
national government than as actions of state sovereignty. 
States, Immigration and Consolidation of a National Regime 
We usually characterize the history of American federalism as following a path that moves from state 
supremacy at the ratification of the Constitution, to co-governance within well-delineated spheres during 
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the era of “dual-federalism”, to the present system in which the national government is supreme and 
states, while retaining authority, operate with little autonomy from the federal government. Accordingly, 
states once designed their own immigration policies, and the shift towards national supremacy was 
gradual but relatively unabated once begun. The demands of immigration regulation required early 
development of an expansive national administrative and regulatory enforcement apparatus. Delineation 
of who was and was not admissible meant early articulation of a nation-centric citizenship [42,43]. 
Moreover, while state immigration activism has been a feature of this policy area since the nation’s 
inception [44], once the Court was asked to respond to possible jurisdictional overreach, it has acted 
decisively and, for over a century, consistently in favor of the federal government’s exclusive right to 
design, develop and enforce such policies3. 
At the nation’s founding, states were in charge of immigration regulation and several took steps to bar 
undesirable foreigners. State laws and some state constitutions defined classes of excludable immigrants such 
as “convicts and paupers”, the “diseased”, slaves and free blacks whose importation and migration were 
controlled in accordance with the status of slaveholding and free [44]. In the absence of centralized 
immigration administration, port cities processed newcomers, developed immigrant registries and provided 
health inspections. State and municipal officials designed revenue-raising schemes to cover the putative costs 
of running and maintaining ports. As insurance against admission of paupers, criminals, “idiots,” prostitutes, 
and the like, state officials required bonds from ship owners and/or the collection of head taxes. 
Immigrant exclusion, however, was not the only state concern. The following passage from John 
Higham’s Strangers in the Land (1969) shows states competing to lure immigrants to their lands: 
The demand for immigrants was most widespread and intense outside the densely populated 
states of the Northeast; in the West and South, virtually every state appointed agents or boards 
of immigration to lure new settlers from overseas. Michigan began the practice in 1845. By 
the end of the Civil War the northwestern states were competing with each other for 
Europeans to people their vacant lands and develop their economies. The South joined in, 
hoping to divert part of the current in its direction in order to restore shattered commonwealths 
and replace emancipated Negroes. In the 1860’s and 1870’s, at least twenty-five out of  
thirty-eight states took official action to promote immigration. South Carolina, in its 
desperation, added the inducement of a five-year tax exemption on all real estate bought by 
immigrants ([45], pp. 17–18). 
These state-led initiatives, though, occurred alongside ascendance of the national government and the 
centralization of policies of exclusion, administration, and revenue collection. 
The decades immediately following the ratification of the Constitution were ones of robust state 
governance and limited national government. The Constitution’s framers were unclear in assigning 
responsibilities across the federal system, and as a result, immigration was only one matter that prompted 
intergovernmental clashes [16]. Early jurisdictional conflicts over immigration involved questions of 
regulation of commerce, and were arguably as significant to the ascendance of the national government 
as more commonly known early cases like Gibbons v. Ogden or McCulloch v. Maryland. In The 
Passenger Cases [46] a fractious court determined that portions of New York and Massachusetts state 
                                                 
3  For more extensive accounting and related case law see [9] and [12]. 
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laws applying a per-head tax on foreign ship masters were unconstitutional because their implementation 
interfered with congressional power granted under the Commerce Clause. What is less clear from the 
three different opinions issued in this case was whether immigration of free people amounted to 
“commerce”. Also unsettled was whether, in the complete absence of congressional law on a matter, 
states must still defer to federal power, or whether states could articulate their interests until Congress 
took steps to legislate in that area. 
It wasn’t until decisions in Henderson v. City of New York (1875) and Chy Lung v. Freeman (1875), 
that the Court elaborated on the constitutional bases of federal exclusivity and defined the interests served 
in maintaining that exclusivity of immigration control. At issue in Henderson were similar statutes in 
Louisiana and New York that required collection and payment of a head tax from foreign ships prior to 
disembarking. In outlining the decision against state-mandated ship taxes, Justice Samuel Miller stated: 
Though it be conceded that there is a class of legislation which may affect commerce, both 
with foreign nations and between the states, in regard to which the laws of the states may be 
valid in the absence of action under the authority of Congress on the same subjects, this can 
have no reference to matters which are in their nature national or which admit of a uniform 
system or plan of regulation ([47], p. 260). 
In short, even in the absence of specific congressional laws, state activities that might impinge  
on Congress’s constitutional authority over commerce and intergovernmental relations superseded  
state interests. 
Chy Lung involved twenty two Chinese women imprisoned in San Francisco when the ship’s captain 
refused to pay bonds for them. Here, the California statute under scrutiny targeted potentially 
burdensome immigrants for bonds instead of relying on a universally applied head tax (as was the case 
in Henderson). California’s elaborate regulations endowed its Commissioner of Immigration with the 
power to board a ship, unilaterally determine the excludability of individual immigrants, demand 
indemnity for those he deemed might become public charges, and walk away with a percentage of the 
fees collected. In this instance, the commissioner determined that the detainees were “lewd and 
debauched women”. The Court was united in its decision against California, which Justice Samuel Miller 
criticized as having produced 
…a statute…framed, to place in the hands of a single man the power to prevent entirely 
vessels engaged in a foreign trade, say with China, from carrying passengers, or to compel 
them to submit to systematic extortion of the grossest kind ([48], p. 278). 
In his opinion, Miller further described California’s overreach as potentially detrimental to U.S. 
foreign relations, and therefore out of line with constitutional powers of Congress and the Executive4. 
The post-Reconstruction incarnation of the United States as a unified entity with a territorially-defined 
people, would, in turn, find its expression in a host of new immigration regulations designed to admit 
immigrants in line with evolving and ascriptive citizen ideals based on race, class, and gender [49–51]. 
Congress soon erected its own public charge laws, and criteria for inadmissible immigrants replicated 
those originally articulated at the state level. Regional anti-Chinese fervor found a national stage when 
                                                 
4  Justice Miller rejected the revenue-raising rationale behind the since the money was not used specifically for  
immigrant care. 
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California’s sizable delegation in Congress eventually influenced the passage of the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act ([52], pp. 105–7). A national immigration monitoring system required the deployment of 
a national administrative and enforcement regime. The growing power and centralization of the national 
government in this area, in turn, benefitted from the support of successive court decisions that further 
buttressed national jurisdictional claims in place of those of the states. 
In the Chinese Exclusion Cases the Court established the plenary power doctrine, ruling that 
congressional authority is virtually absolute in defining which standards and rules applied for admission, 
deportation or removal of [53,54]. The decision strengthened earlier rulings citing the constitutional 
sources of national supremacy seen in Henderson and Chy Lung. It privileged Congress and the 
Executive in the design and execution of immigration laws with virtually no opening for judicial review. 
Eventually, quantitative restrictions 1920s quota systems would expand the national apparatus required 
to regulate immigrant admissions. 
By contrast, Congress never articulated a uniform immigrant policy. The years 1910–1924 (also years 
of highest immigration levels), did, however, provide the context for an Americanization movement. 
Leaders at all levels of government, social and educational reformers all championed programs to 
encourage cultural and linguistic assimilation. Although federal funds existed for agencies and 
organizations that promoted middle class Anglo conformity and conservative nationalism, there was no 
unifying national policy, sole national agency, or even national official in charge of the effort. Congress 
made Americanization official concurrent with the passage of the 1924 National Quotas Act. Still, even 
in the field of education where, as vehicles of assimilation, schools were expected to teach English and 
civic values, program delivery was left to state and local agencies and organizations with programs 
already in place [55]. 
Instead, the states shaped possible paths for immigrant integration within the national administration of 
entry and removal. With the consolidation of power and relative ascendance of the American nation, 
state interest in immigration governance remained, though the role of states was now limited. A solid 
doctrine of national supremacy was in place by the time Congress dismantled National Origins first in 
1952, and then again with the ground-breaking 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, though states still 
provided for the day-to-day welfare of all those residing in their domains. Jurisdictional fights occurred 
when Congress had not occupied the field5. The absence of national direction was also the source of 
dispute in DeCanas v. Bica [57]. In this case, a California state law prohibited the knowing employment 
of unauthorized immigrants at a time when Congress did not. The case arrived in the Supreme Court 
after the California Appeals Court deemed the state law unconstitutional on preemption grounds. The 
Supreme Court reversed that ruling, reasoning that just because a state law indirectly or directly affected 
immigrants did not mean such a law implied state regulation of immigration, and that states’ general 
right to govern the employment relationship extended to unauthorized immigrants. Thus, the ruling 
                                                 
5  In Hines v. Davidowitz (1941), Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act of 1939 preceded Congress’s passage of the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940. The Pennsylvania Law was enjoined by 3 district judges who claimed the state law both 
infringed on congressional powers and also denied equal protection to aliens under section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1870. The Supreme Court concurred, with Justice Hugo Black arguing that implementation of the Pennsylvania law would 
create an obstacle to congressional objectives [56]. 
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upheld the state law, but it also specified the rules of preemption that would, in turn, inform future state 
immigration and immigrant laws. 
However, as state electorates fought national ascendancy in civil rights protections (the state’s rights 
movement), redistributive social policies (the tax revolts of the 1970s and early 1980s), a new front 
would emerge among states that used policy to divide the deserving population of taxpayers and citizens 
from poor and minority residents believed to drain public resources [58]. Immigrant populations—once 
targeted by state policies for depressing wages and work conditions, criminality, and non-assimilability, 
increasingly became targets of state laws and voter initiatives that pursue redress for unauthorized 
immigrants as fiscal burdens. Compared to their position on state efforts to regulated entry and exit, the 
courts were less consistent on public benefits restrictions: conflicts over the permissibility of state 
constriction of benefits for immigrants were sometimes ruled unconstitutional [57,59,60]. Decisions 
turned on whether such state laws fell into the category of immigration regulation, or whether they 
involved violations of the equal protection clause. But, some decisions were critical to protecting the states’ 
authority, particularly in the area of employment [57,61] when it was deemed clearer which state interests 
these laws served, and that implementation did not infringe upon national powers. 
State immigration policies and the jurisdictional conflicts ignited by such measures provide insights 
into whether states are expected to operate in tandem with the national government, maintain spheres of 
sovereignty within a structure determined by the national government, or have space to operate 
independently. Even this brief overview however, illustrates the problem with assuming a clear 
distinction exists between immigration policy and immigrant policy; the Court itself has not ruled  
in a manner that confirms such boundaries [62]. Underlying all of these battles is a more fundamental 
divide over the national responsibility to ensure security, to meet economic demands, and to manage 
claims-making—all of which have been complicated by co-existing trends: the devolution of social 
policy delivery from the national government to the states and the integration of law enforcement 
agencies for the purposes of national security and immigration enforcement. Thus while state-federal 
clashes over immigration are a longstanding feature of this policy area, more recent state efforts to 
control, expel or accommodate their immigrant populations must be considered in light of these 
significant changes to national policy designs that positioned states as arbiters of claims-making, and 
how, in turn, states have emerged as the sites of anti-Washington revolt. 
4. Immigration Federalism in the Contemporary Era 
This section explores the nature and content of state laws passed during the legislative years of 2006 
through 2013. The intensity of state activity is unprecedented in the modern immigration era: all fifty 
states have contributed to the passage of thousands of laws and resolutions that target immigrants, their 
employers, as well as agencies that serve them. The analysis also compares state laws to the national 
policy context, and identifies patterns of cooperation in state-federal policies, and then focuses on areas 
of state-federal conflict. 
The legislative data are from a database the author compiled from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) Immigrant Policy Project [4]. The NCSL annual reports date back to 2005; the 
database compiled for project covers eight years, 2006–2013, and includes 2257 actions: 851 resolutions 
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and 1406 laws. Seventy of the bills (3 percent) that passed through the statehouses were vetoed (in whole 
or in part) by governors. 
The NCSL annual compilations include brief description of bill contents, and a searchable database 
with links to some bill texts. The contents range from extensive policy measures ensuring state healthcare 
to undocumented immigrants (in the years prior to the Affordable Care Act), to bills that made minor 
changes such as re-naming existing state task forces. Additional information about bills came from state 
news sources in LexisNexis, as well as more focused policy reports from other non-governmental 
organizations tracking state laws, namely the National Immigration Law Center (NILC), the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Although 
these latter organizations are involved in immigrant rights advocacy (as opposed to the NCSL, which 
views itself as a bipartisan research and informational clearinghouse), their websites provide up-to-date 
news on litigation, court decisions, policy implementation and additional legislative actions that may not 
appear in news coverage. 
The NCSL reports also arranged policies by type of output (law or resolution) and classified each 
according to policy area. These categories provided the initial organization, but analysis of content of 
the “miscellaneous/private” bill category produced other types added for the analysis. For example, the 
category “Budgets/Appropriations” first appeared in 2009, but such bills were labeled “miscellaneous” 
in 2006–2008. Bills were re-labeled if their contents indicated they belonged in other categories. 
4.1. State Lawmaking: An Overview 
State activity is largely perceived to coincide with failed congressional attempts to overhaul federal 
policy. Figure 1 depicts annual levels of activity both in terms of bills introduced in state legislatures, 
and those passed. 
 
Figure 1. Annual state activity: immigration bills introduced and passed. Source: National 
Conference of State Legislatures.  
Laws 2015, 4 739 
 
Congressional reform efforts in Congress failed in 2006 and again in 2007, and from 2006–2008 there 
is an observable uptick in legislative output from the states. In successive years, the total would climb, 
with greater movement in 2009 and 2010—years in which the Congress made no indications to address 
immigration issues. Two thousand eleven and 2012 totals are successively lower likely due to several 
factors: by 2011 statehouses were engaged in redistricting for the 2012 election, parts of the 2010 
Affordable Care Act took effect in 2012 and necessitated state level preparations. Also, during this 
period states awaited the Supreme Court’s decision concerning SB 1070 in Arizona v. United States. 
However, by 2013, though early in the year that a bipartisan Senate committee initiated a proposal for 
multi-pronged policy reforms, state legislatures resumed their work. 
Statehouses passed bills that attend to every major class of immigrant—unauthorized, legal 
permanent residents, refugees, foreign students, and temporary/seasonal foreign laborers (technically 
referred to as “non-immigrants”). Also notable is the range of policy areas in which immigration-related 
bills occurred. Tables 1 and 2 sort the 2257 bills according to policy areas, with Table 1 covering laws 
and Table 2 the bills that were actually nonbinding resolutions. 
Table 1. Bills by policy area with resolution totals. Source: National Conference of  
State Legislatures.  
Policy Areas Bill Totals by Area Percent Resolutions 
Celebrate state’s immigrant heritage 365 98% (357) 
Border control & “comprehensive reform” 32 88% (28) 
Private bills, etc. 372 85% (315) 
Legal services for immigrants 30 63% (19) 
Education 161 13% (21) 
Employment 200 13% (25) 
Law enforcement 225 11% (24) 
Omnibus bills 19 11% (2) 
Human trafficking 97 10% (10) 
Health & health care 121 10% (12) 
Public benefits 137 9% (13) 
Voting and elections 32 9% (3) 
ID/Driver’s licenses, other licenses 299 7% (20) 
State budgets/appropriations relating to immigration or related agencies 167 1% (2) 
Of the 2257 bills, 851 (nearly 38 percent of the total) were resolutions—reflecting symbolic 
legislative efforts. As Table 1 shows, the use of resolutions tended to occur with greater frequency in 
specific policy areas. Many states—even the states of Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama for example, 
that otherwise passed extremely strict, anti-immigrant laws during this period—contributed to the 
passage of 359 resolutions recognizing contributions of different immigrant groups to their state’s 
character or its development. These range from numerous state declarations of March as “Irish American 
Heritage Month”, to Illinois’s memorialization of the 100th anniversary of the Cherry Mine disaster 
which claimed immigrant lives. Some of these resolutions praised organizations serving immigrant 
communities. Similarly, the private resolutions (315 in total) involved honors for individual immigrants 
or community and/or religious leaders who had served immigrant communities.  
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Table 2. State laws by policy area. Source: National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Policy Area No. Laws 
1. ID/driver’s licenses/other licenses 279 
2. Law enforcement 201 
3. Employment 175 
4. State budgets/appropriations relating to immigration or related agencies 165 
5. Education 140 
6. Public benefits 124 
7. Health & health care 109 
8. Human trafficking 87 
9. Private bills, etc. 57 
10. Voting and elections 29 
11. Omnibus bills 17 
12. Legal services/assistance 11 
13. Celebrate state’s immigrant heritage  8 
14. Border control 4 
Total Laws 1406 
Resolutions also formalize a state’s stance on immigration and related issues, and they can include 
requests to Congress and the President; such bills provide a mode of address to the federal government 
that is official and public (if primarily symbolic) for issues over which states have no authority. The 
border control resolutions, for example, called on Congress and the President to secure the border or, in 
the case of New Mexico (HM 50, 2008) asked for funding and personnel to repair fencing. Texas 
resolutions (SCR 10, in 2009 and HCR 80, in 2013) requested that Congress investigate inefficiencies 
in border crossings and their effects on commerce with Mexico. Georgia and Louisiana resolutions 
preemptively rejected any congressional plans to legalize unauthorized immigrants and/or ordered their 
state’s national delegation not to support such measures. 
In policy areas of heaviest activity like ID/driver’s licenses, enforcement and employment, laws were 
more dominant than resolutions. In these cases (as was the case as well for public benefits, education 
and health/health care), resolutions were typically promises (without funding) to create task forces to 
study aspects of that area. A typical example would be a Hawai’i’s 2007 directive to the state’s 
Department of Human Services to study the state’s immigrants who have been victims of trafficking, or 
several states’ pledges to develop studies related to educational or health concerns associated with 
immigrant communities. 
Returning though, to the fact that the top areas for state activity produced laws and not symbolic 
overtures, Table 2 presents the 1406 laws sorted by policy area, which in turn shows the areas of  
greatest activity. 
The top three areas of lawmaking vary in terms of the degree of authority states can claim. States 
exercise primary authority over identification, driving and professional licensing. When it comes to 
employment, states enjoy a considerable degree of regulatory and administrative authority, but must 
operate in tandem with national laws. In the area of law enforcement, states may take a supportive or 
cooperative part in the execution of a national goals. Since the interplay of nation and state in law 
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enforcement and employment driver’s licenses have also sourced jurisdictional conflicts the next 
sections will elaborate on state activity within the national policy scheme. 
4.1.1. Identification and Licensing 
Drivers’ licenses, identification, and other licensing comprised the single area of greatest frequency. 
Some of the bills set standards for professional, business and recreational licensing. However, numerous 
state bills also addressed the 2005 REAL ID Act with laws and resolutions seeking to avoid, or 
grandstand against federal efforts to standardize the states’ drivers’ licenses and personal IDs. 
Congress passed the REAL ID Act in response to the 9/11 Commission. Although national 
identification had previously been contentious, Congress allocated limited debate upon REAL ID’s 
introduction, and attached the measure to an emergency appropriations bill to fund the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars [63]. The Act targeted weaknesses in the states’ licensing practices—such as easy 
counterfeiting and multiple issuance—that the 9/11 hijacker exploited. REAL ID mandated improved 
security with inclusion of biometrics and other machine-readable information. The law required all  
non-citizen applicants for licenses or state identification cards to provide documentation of lawful 
presence in the United States, and required states to use the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Systematic Alien Verification of Entitlement (SAVE) database to test document authenticity and prevent 
unofficial immigrants from obtaining identifiers. 
REAL ID has resulted in state-driven backlash, and the chief complaint is against the cost of 
reconfiguring state DMV’s to achieve federal design requirements [37]. REAL ID resistance took both 
substantive and symbolic forms. Table 3 subdivides the 300 bills assigned to the “driver’s license/ID/other 
license” category. The column on the right references professional and business licensing requirements 
and fee schedules—subcategories over which states have unimpeded authority. The left-hand column, by 
contrast, contains a tally of laws whose contents reflect state responses to federal REAL ID. 
Table 3. State ID/drivers and other licensing bills, 2006–2013. 
ID/Driver’s License Bills  Other State License Bills  
Allows ID/ Driver’s irrespective of immigration status 8 Professional Licensing 63 
ID theft/fraud 16 Other Requirements (fees, expiration dates) 49 
Anti-REAL ID 28 Gun permits/licensing 34 
Regulations Consistent with REAL ID 51 Regulatory Business/Operating 32 
  Recreational licensing (hunting, fishing, etc.) 16 
  Birth certificates (overseas adoptions) 3 
Subtotal 103 Subtotal 197 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Eight laws are “expansive” in specifying that immigration status is not a prerequisite for attaining a 
driver’s license; Vermont, Colorado, Connecticut, California, Illinois, each passed its own version with 
its own regulations in 2013. Laws pertaining to ID Theft/Fraud penalized use of falsified documents in 
any official capacity or to secure employment—measures aimed at undocumented immigrants. Twenty 
eight bills (fifteen laws and thirteen resolutions) were “Anti-REAL ID” in their rejection of federal 
guidelines. These took various forms: the South Carolina legislature, for example, directed the governor 
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not to implement any aspect of REAL ID (H 4823, 2008); other states gave similar orders to their DMV 
heads (e.g., Louisiana’s HB 715, 2008 or Alaska’s SB 202, 2008). Other states refused to REAL ID 
oriented appropriations for DMVs. The resolutions commanded Congress to repeal the law. 
The subcategory, “Regulations consistent with REAL ID” however, offers a twist to this tale of state 
rebellion. Fifty one state laws made acquisition of licenses and ID’s more difficult by limiting  
which documents legal immigrants could supply for their applications, or required even lawful 
immigrants to renew in person instead of online. Other states appropriated money for enhanced cards 
with anti-counterfeiting features. 
4.1.2. Law Enforcement 
The area of immigration law enforcement has transformed from a system in which national agencies 
once practiced near exclusive authority, to a system that engages lower-level agencies to accomplish 
national goals. Congressional policy and federal agency initiatives from DHS, ICE and DOJ, engage 
with state and local law to assist in status checks and detention of immigrants. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act facilitated interagency information-sharing, a practice that would 
accelerate after the 11 September 2001 terror attacks. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act’s section 287(g) permitted state and local police to enter into formal 
agreements with the Department of Justice (later the DHS) to assist in the apprehension and detention 
of unauthorized immigrants in areas beyond the reach of national immigration enforcement agencies. In 
2002, Florida became the first participant; by 2012 a total of 19 states had units involved (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General 2013). 
With the roll-out of the ICE initiative, Secure Communities in 2008 (a program designed to “to 
identify and remove aliens who pose a threat to public safety”), the framework for extension of federal 
reach into states, counties and municipalities effectively blurred pre-existing lines of authority for the 
purposes of interior enforcement. The strategy was to focus on apprehension and removal of unauthorized 
immigrants who had committed aggravated or violent felonies and thus allow ICE to prosecute people 
in violation of immigration laws when state and/or local authorities caught immigrants violating criminal 
laws. In practice the DHS’s own Task Force on Secure Communities noted confusion, misinformation, 
and abuse of program responsibilities. Participating local authorities would entrap unauthorized 
immigrants whose offenses were technically minor violations (traffic infractions, for example) not level 
1 felonies (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2011). In December, 2012 ICE announced that it would 
no longer renew 287(g) agreements (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2012)6. 
The national context matters for this policy area because state and local engagement in enforcement 
was voluntary. Thus bills in the “law enforcement” category predominantly represent state efforts to 
cooperate with federal efforts, as summarized in Table 4. 
                                                 
6  Human trafficking laws appeared 97 times, and the content of these bills typically brought aspects of state law 
enforcement in concert with the national Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, which aims to 
combat trafficking and shield victims and witnesses from prosecution. 
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Table 4. Summary of state immigration enforcement laws, 2006–2013. 
Type of Immigration Enforcement Law 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1. Appropriations for enforcement-related 
programs and agencies... 
NJ 
AZ (2) * MI, 
NY, TN (2) 
MS AZ (2) AZ SC   
2. Directives for detaining, sentencing, or 
incarcerating criminal suspects, defendants, 
or witnesses who are suspected/discovered 
to be illegal aliens… 
GA **, OH, 
IL (2), VA 
AZ (2)  
AZ CO 
AL, GA,  
IL, VA 
 CA, LA,SC 
AZ (3),  
CA (2, 1 
vetoed), 
CO, TX 
DE OK 
3. Allow transfer of custody of illegal and/or 
criminal aliens to federal authorities… 
OH NY, IL, TX NC AR, NH, OK AZ WA DC, IL, PA  
4. Mandate checks on immigration status of 
individuals detained for felony or drunk 
driving charge… 
GA, OH NC GA, VA AZ, LA, OK     
5. Mandate state agencies to cooperate with 
federal immigration law enforcement 
(includes directives for information-
sharing)… 
CO, GA, OH OK, TN CO 
CA (vetoed) 
TN, UT 
GA, VA 
AZ, 
MN (vetoed) 
TX, VA 
 AL 
6. Defines act of “harboring” unlawful 
immigrants as a crime in state code… 
GA    AZ, OK MT (vetoed) IN  
7. Directives regarding immigrants who are 
convicted sex offenders… 
CO, SD ME, OK, TN 
CA, HI, UT, 
TN, CA 
IA, TN,  
UT, AL 
AL, CT, UT, 
MD, TN, KS 
CA, ND, 
CT, UT, MI, 
MS, NM, 
OK, SD 
KS, ME, UT CO, MI, NM, 
8. Limit use of restraints on pregnant women 
in custody (includes women held in custody 
for immigration violations)… 
    PA  DE, FL, LA  
9. Officers must be U.S. citizens…     OK   TX 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, author-coded; *Numbers in parentheses indicate passage of more than one bill for that year in that subcategory; **Georgia’s 
SB 529 (2006) and Ohio’s SB 9 (2006) were omnibus bill coving several enforcement areas, which is why they appear more than once.  
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Among the examples are appropriations for immigration enforcement, promises to surrender 
individuals found in violation of immigration laws to federal officials, directives to lower agencies to 
check the immigration status of anyone who winds up in police custody, pledges to lobby DHS for 
funding should circumstances warrant, and mandates that all or some state agencies outside of criminal 
justice cooperate with law enforcement efforts. 
4.1.3. Employment Laws 
States are expected to operate within a federal regulatory framework that designates which 
immigrants are authorized to work, how they may prove work eligibility, and that designates penalties 
for employment violations. In 1996 the federal government tested an automated employment verification 
system, (first called Basic Pilot, then re-named E-Verify), and encouraged, but did not mandate its use 
in states. As Table 5 shows, much of the regulatory content of the employment laws passed from 2006–2013 
involves states mandating use of E-Verify among different classes of employers (such as those receiving 
public contracts in Pennsylvania, Oklahoma and Missouri, among other states). Nineteen states currently 
mandate some use of the program; Arizona, Utah, Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi have the broadest 
mandates and strictest penalties. Other state bills do not mandate E-Verify, but do demand that 
employers establish work eligibility. 
The 1986 IRCA forms the basis of federal regulation of work eligibility and punishment for 
employers, but when the 2007 Legal Arizona Worker’s Act (LAWA) punished hiring outside the new 
law with confiscation of business licenses, the tougher state penalty (and a similar one in Oklahoma) 
was challenged for exceeding national law. The Court’s decision to uphold LAWA in Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting (2011), opened the door for other states to use work eligibility and workplace 
participation enforcement as an alternate route to immigration enforcement. 
Table 5. Types of state employment laws, 2006–2013. 
Type of Employment Law 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1. Mandates BasicPilot/e-
Verify…* 
CO, PA, 
TN, GA 
AZ, GA, 
IA, MI, 
TN, CO, 
GA, OKT, 
PA 
CO, ID, AZ 
MS, AZ,  
SC * UT 
 
GA,  
UT, VA 
LA, TN,  
VA (2) 
LA, 
PA, 
WV 
GA, 
MO 
2. Verification of work 
eligibility (without mandate 
for Basic Pilot/E-Verify)… 
 
TX, HI, 
IA, WV 
VA (3),  
TN, WV 
IL, UT 
FL,  
NE (2) 
NC   
3. Workplace regulation, 
employment taxes, civil 
rights protections… 
ID, WA, 
GA 
AR, AZ, 
GA, IL 
AZ, CO, FL  
CA, IA, 
SC,  
VA, WA 
CA, UT, VA 
CT, 
CA 
 
4. Proof of legal status 
required to collect 
unemployment insurance or 
workman’s compensation.... 
ID, KS, 
WA 
HI, CO, 
IL, KS, 
LA, MN, 
MS, MT, 
NM, OR, 
UT, ME 
AK      
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Table 5. Cont. 
Type of Employment Law 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5. Penalties for employer 
violations of state eligibility 
laws… 
LA, 
GA,CO 
AZ, TN, 
WV, OKb 
AZ, CO, 
MD, MO, 
MS, VA 
HI, TN 
HI, KS, 
ME, WV, 
WI 
LA 
MA,  
VA, TN 
 
6. Penalties for immigrants 
falsifying work eligibility… 
   TN (2)  ID NH  
7. Restricts unemployment 
and/or workman’s comp, 
job training based on  
legal status... 
   
MN, 
IA, IL 
MS,  
NE, OK 
MI, MIS, 
MO, NJ 
(vetoed), 
OR, UT, 
WA 
AL TN 
8. State limits or bans 
employer participation in 
BasicPilot/ E-Verify 
 IL (Ban)    
CA 
(Bans 
unless 
federal 
funding at 
stake) 
  
* States vary in classes of employers that require use of Basic Pilot/ E-Verify. States appearing across several 
years expanded the classes of employers required to participate. 
4.1.4. Other Policy Areas 
After the top three categories, other state bills fell into policy areas that fall primarily to the states, 
like education, or that depend on states for service delivery such as public benefits (which includes 
programs such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) that was devolved to the states to manage 
in 1996) and health-related bills (many of these prior to the passage of ACA named unlawful immigrants 
as an excluded class from state coverage or included them). 
The rules of voting and elections encompass another area almost entirely under state purview7, the 
thirty two state laws in this field primarily defined voter eligibility to include only citizens, and itemized 
acceptable documentation for proof of citizenship/voter eligibility (examples from 2011 are Alabama 
and Georgia, in 2012 Kansas and Utah, in 2013 and Virginia, with states like Colorado and New 
Hampshire passing bills that updated or reconfirmed existing voter eligibility bills). In 2013 Virginia 
passed an addition law requiring that the state Board of Elections register with and  
cross-check registrants against the SAVE (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) database to 
prove voter eligibility. 
  
                                                 
7  Voting rights are protected by federal legislation (the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its extensions and renewals through 
2007) and enforced via the Justice Department. Although states are in charge of redistricting for purposes of congressional 
reapportionment, when a state’s electoral maps are criticized for impinging on voting rights, these can land in the Justice 
Department or even the federal court. 
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4.2. Immigration Federalism 2006–2013: A Reassessment 
The contents of bills from the top three categories shows state lawmaking in service of federal 
programs that encourage state involvement, or legislation that reiterates nationally-defined goals. Even 
the hostile state response to REAL ID did not preclude measures among states to tighten access to 
identifiers—which is a goal of the federal law. 
In the area of state immigration enforcement laws, it is clear that federal policies put in place prior to 
the explosion in state enforcement laws (such as the 1995 ATEDPA and 1996 IIRAIRA) created 
channels for state involvement, because state laws have an iterative quality to them: they cite federal 
laws and agencies, and they identify their role as falling within federally-defined guidelines. State laws 
that reach beyond these, like Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s SB 56, still identified existing federal 
law as justification for their existence. Congressional policy would guard against the Court’s rejection 
of SB 1070s most controversial section, 2b. In the less delimited area of employment laws, states enjoy 
broad parameters for action, even when (as was true for the Whiting decision concerning the 2007 
LAWA and 2007 Oklahoma omnibus provisions) state regulations and penalties exceed those provided 
for in federal law [62]. Referring back to Table 5, states have also utilized this space to restrict 
employment-related benefits via immigration status checks, they have instituted penalties for unauthorized 
workers. But, some states have also expanded protections for unauthorized immigrant workers: 
California’s 2012 law extended civil rights protections to domestic workers, and Iowa, Virginia and 
Washington each redefined “work” to include services performed by unauthorized alien workers. 
While the top three areas of state immigration lawmaking (ID/driver’s licenses/other licenses, law 
enforcement, and employment) suggest most states are crafting policies aimed toward the restriction of 
unauthorized immigrants, some states are pursuing accommodation in ways that clash with national 
goals. Such actions are most visible in state laws addressing higher education and identification access for 
unauthorized immigrants. The following two sections present sources of challenges to federal policy. 
4.2.1. Higher Education Access for Undocumented Immigrants 
The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors proposal (commonly referred to as the 
DREAM Act), a proposal to allow young, unauthorized immigrants who are enrolled in post-secondary 
education or military service an opportunity to legalize, has languished in Congress despite reintroduction 
and continued consideration. Some states have moved to either open their post-secondary institutions 
and/or facilitate access by charging in-state tuition (typically much lower than that charged to foreign 
students or out-of-state residents) and have done so by making residency (rather than legal status) the 
mechanism for claiming the benefit. States pursuing such measures run the risk of violating federal law: 
Section 505 of the federal 1996 IIRIRA prohibits states from allowing undocumented immigrants access 
to their colleges and universities, and non-compliance could lead to loss of federal funds [64]. 
Nonetheless, seventeen states offer some form of access for students who are otherwise 
undocumented, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. States extending in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants by 2013. 
These states admit immigrants who graduated from that state’s primary and secondary schools to pay 
in-state tuition regardless of legal status. Even if it were to pass, the DREAM Act does not contain an 
in-state tuition mandate: states would retain the authority to make those determinations. The seventeen 
states listed above might be considered as most reflective of state-level independence since most passed 
their laws prior to the Obama administration’s executive action, known as DACA, or Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals in August 2012. Motivated in part by congressional stalemate on minors who 
have lived in the U.S. most of their lives and, who are broadly considered most deserving of relief, 
DACA lifted the specter of deportation for 1.2 million young people. Even after DACA, however, 
education access laws remain significant for that population: recent research shows approximately  
fifty five percent of those eligible for DACA applied, with individuals enrolled in secondary and  
post-secondary educational institutions most likely to seek DACA [65]. 
4.2.2. Driver’s Licenses and State-Issued Personal Identifiers 
In 2013, eight states passed laws that would extend the availability of driver’s licenses and/or personal 
identifiers to individuals based on proof of residency. As Figure 3 shows, prior to 2013, only two states, 
Washington and Utah, offered licenses to people unable to prove lawful immigration status. 
Significantly, California was among the states expanding access in 2013, and its size ensured that its 
decision reverberated nationally. The California license is a “marked” card, meaning that it clearly 
specifies that it is not a valid form of national identification. While the markings signal that the card does 
not offer proof of certification of legal status, AB 60 also included anti-discrimination provisions to 
protect carriers of the redesigned card. The statute also “explicitly prohibits using the license for criminal 
investigation, or arrest based on immigration status” [66]. These provisions stand in contrast to the 
federally-encouraged and state-copied trends toward inter-agency information sharing for enforcement and 
immigration purposes featured in many state enforcement and employment eligibility laws. 
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Figure 3. States offering driver’s licenses or permits for unauthorized immigrants by 2013. 
There is some variation among the state systems to expand eligibility for licenses. Like California, 
Colorado, Connecticut and Maryland, have deployed a “two-tiered” license system that allows  
their DMVs to issue REAL ID-compliant cards for eligible individuals who can supply necessary 
documentation. For recipients of second-tier cards, disclaimers such as “Not valid for federal 
identification, voting, or public benefits purposes”, (Colorado) feature prominently, and some cards 
denote validity only for the purposes of driving within those states. Utah, Nevada and Illinois policies 
are more limited: these states offer proof of driving “authorization” or “privilege” that is both narrowly 
useful and that is temporary: Utah’s, for example, expires in a year. These driver authorization laws do 
not extend to non-driving identifiers as in California and Colorado. 
Earlier, the survey of state laws in the subcategories of driver’s licenses and identifiers showed most 
states moving toward stricter application requirements, including steeper penalties for misrepresentation 
and/or presentation of false documentation for personal employment or professional engagement, as well 
as to secure state documents. All of these measures are restrictions targeting unofficial immigrants, whose 
status is a matter of federal law. By contrast, California, Colorado, Connecticut and other states have 
taken steps as subnational governments to formalize and legitimate people occupying their spaces who 
exist outside the boundaries of federal law. 
5. Discussion 
“The bill I’m about to sign into law—Senate Bill 1070—represents another tool for our state 
to use as we work to solve a crisis we did not create and the federal government has refused 
to fix the crisis caused by illegal immigration and Arizona’s porous border”. 
—Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, 2010 [67] 
“When a million people without their documents drive legally and with respect in the state 
of California, the rest of this country will have to stand up and take notice”. 
—California Governor Jerry Brown, 2013 [68] 
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Immigration is a subject that lends itself to symbolic politicking [69], and there has been quite a bit 
of political posturing by state governors and legislators who claim that their states are forced to legislate 
immigration in the wake of failed federal efforts. This is not to say that state legislative activity has little 
substantive or practical impact—to the contrary, as the 2006–2013 legislative analysis demonstrates, 
immigrants of all conceivable statuses are facing confusing and irregular statutory arrangements that 
shift from state to state. In the case of law enforcement, there are even differences within states as cities 
pursue their own agendas [15]. However, state lawmaking that tests federal authority also engages with 
a symbolic politics of federalism. Murray Edelman, who conceived of the role of symbolism in 
structuring politics, saw value in condensation symbols which provoke threat or provide reassurance 
particularly on issues with high saliency or controversy ([41], p. 7). State-level policy activism reassures 
the public that someone is attending to immigration matters even if Washington DC is not. From this 
perspective, if a state law faces court challenges or is struck down, these outcomes do not negate that 
governors and/or legislatures are trying to craft solutions, and that they are doing so further amplifies 
the absence of congressional action. 
The two statements above, each from governors presiding over states with contrasting approaches to 
unauthorized immigrants, capture this communicative facet of state-level lawmaking; each governor’s 
statement positions their state within a broader, national debate about what should be done for the 
resident unauthorized population. Each reflects on state law as substantive accomplishment. Significantly, 
however, national laws governing each of these areas do exist and federal actions may negate the 
operationalization if not the statutory components of either measure. The conflict identified in Governor 
Brewer’s statement conceals the manner in which national law enforcement has penetrated states and 
localities at their invitation, and with their cooperation. In the case of state driver’s licenses and IDs, 
areas in which the federal government mandates REAL ID compliant identifiers for access are growing 
increasingly constricted, and, correspondingly, starting January of 2016, residents of states not in 
compliance with federal standards will not be able to board even domestic flights [70]. While Governor 
Brown is correct that his state’s statute will facilitate the regulatory aspects of driving and may bring a 
measure of respect and ease of burden on the undocumented population, the fact remains that this policy 
solution with national ramifications remains narrowly limited to his geographic jurisdiction. Freedom of 
movement within the U.S.—a significant if underappreciated liberty—will still only be enjoyed by those 
with nationally-defined status. 
Moreover, just as mobilization occurs to push certain policies, immigration hard-liners have also 
mobilized against driver’s license extensions. New Mexico’s Republican governor, Maria Martinez, has 
attempted to have that state’s driving privileges repealed, and the GOP in Colorado has endeavored to 
halt implementation of that state’s more recent driver’s license law [71]. Recipients of the 2012 Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) who are supposed to be able to work and drive as per executive 
action, were denied driver’s licenses in Arizona and Nebraska until the 9th Circuit ordered Arizona’s 
compliance with federal law in 2014 and the Nebraska state legislature revised their law and even 
overrode the governor’s veto in 2015. In the latter case, legislators revised the state statute in accordance 
with federal REAL ID law which makes DACA recipients an eligible class for state licenses [72]. 
Whether states opt to involve immigrants based on fact of residency or whether they decide to restrict 
by aligning their definitions of membership with those provided for in federal law, the federal system, 
particularly in its present form of intertwined responsibilities, provides the mechanisms for states to do 
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so. However, as a governance ideology that legitimates states that solve immigration problems in their 
own way, these symbolic appeals to states as pragmatic problem-solvers that fulfil a positive role in the 
American policy system, obscures the rise of a multi-layered enforcement system, and the persistence 
of ill-defined and uneven civil rights protections that now characterize our immigration regime. 
6. Conclusions 
The fact that state immigration policies are framed as intergovernmental conflicts is not new—in fact, 
federal absence from the area of immigration is a recurring motif in national and subnational immigration 
conflicts. What this article stresses, however, is that symbolic federalism—which provides an ideological 
backing to state involvement in an area where the federal government has long dominated and continues 
to constrain, shape, and define possibilities for state involvement. In its current form, symbolic 
federalism has distinguishable features. One of its forms, fiscal conservatism, locates states’ problems 
in immigrant consumption of public benefits. Calavita (1996) recognized this when she identified 
California’s Proposition 187 as a symbolic policy whose passage captured public anger and discontent 
with welfare state retrenchment and refocused those anxieties on immigrants. Years afterwards—and 
apart from California’s political and policy pivot away from 187—other states have followed suit. This 
outcome was not inevitable, but it was enabled with federal statutes encouraged with federal enforcement 
agencies seeking subnational modes by which to expand their interior reach. 
A second form of symbolic federalism depends on federal-state conflict to showcase state autonomy 
and policy pragmatism historically associated with both conservative and progressive state approaches 
to social problems [16]. This analysis considered the recent surge in state immigration lawmaking 
through the lens of symbolic federalism in an effort to shed light on the politics of state-driven 
lawmaking. This symbolic aspect of American federalism justifies both conservative and progressive 
calls to devolve policy away from the national government. Its framework promotes states as a pragmatic 
alternatives to congressional gridlock. Future inquiries into state and local laws should also account for 
how state immigration activism engages with this evocative politics, and it, in turn, shapes the terrain 
upon which these policy battles are fought. 
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